Many developers use GitHub Actions. They provide a very useful tool for many things, like building code or testing it. Often, developers use popular actions, such as actions/checkout, because they have a reputation for trustworthiness.

But could someone change a trusted action without anyone knowing?

In this post, a problem with how GitHub forks work will be shown. This problem lets a bad person put their own code into a trusted action, even if they lack permission to change the action.

Kubernetes DNS provides a streamlined way for pods to discover one another using short, user-friendly names, keeping complex IP addresses out of sight. Yet, this very convenience can mask a significant security flaw. Without a thorough grasp of Kubernetes DNS behavior, an opening for attackers might unknowingly be created. Consider this: the ability to create namespaces and services allows an attacker to reroute traffic intended to leave a cluster, diverting it for their own purposes.